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The license for Kori-1, the first commercial reactor in Busan, Korea, was terminated in June 2017;
therefore, preparations are being made for its decommissioning. Because the radioactivity of Bio-shield
varies greatly throughout the structure, the doses received by the workers depend on the location, order,
and duration of dismantling operations. Thus, a model for evaluating the worker external dose during the
dismantling of the Kori-1 bio-shield was developed, and work scenarios for dose assessment were
designed. The Dose evaluation code VISIPLAN was used for dose assessment. The dose rate around the
bio-shield was evaluated and the level of exposure to the operator was evaluated according to the work
scenario. The maximum annual external dose was calculated as 746.86 mSv for a diamond wire saw
operator under dry cutting conditions, indicating that appropriate protective measures, such as changing
dismantling sequence, remote monitoring, shield installation, and adjustment of work team are neces-
sary for the safe dismantling of the bio-shield. Through these protective measures, it was found that the
worker's dose could be below the dose limit.
© 2020 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
When a nuclear power plant (NPP) reaches the end of its design
life, its safety must be evaluated to determine whether it should
undergo life extension or permanent shutdown. The NPP decom-
missioning industry is nowmore prevalent than ever in the nuclear
power industry. To date, approximately 173 units are permanently
shutdown and 115 unit are undergoing decommissioning around
the world [1]. Although Korean research reactors, such as Korea
Research Reactor-1&2 (KRR-1&2), have been decommissioned
[2e4], Kori-1 is the first case of decommissioning a Korean com-
mercial NPP. Kori-1 was commissioned in 1978 with an operating
license that terminated in June 2017. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power
(KHNP)dthe owner of Kori-1ddecided to not apply for life
extension of Kori-1, so they are preparing for its decommissioning.
Fig. 1 shows the history of Kori Unit 1 and its upcoming schedule
[5]. Unfortunately, the experience gained from decommissioning
Korean research reactors is not directly applicable to Kori-1 because
research and commercial reactors require different approaches for
decommissioning owing to differences in reactor power, design,kimhr@unist.ac.kr
p.K.a.–>e.R. Kim).
by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is anand level of activation. Therefore, much preparation is necessary for
the decommissioning of Kori-1.
The bio-shield is the wall that surrounds the reactor, shielding
against external doses during reactor operation by absorbing neu-
trons emitted from the reactor. The bio-shield has a long lifespan, but
its radioactivity varies greatly throughout the structure. Because the
bio-shield is so large, it takesa long time todismantle,which increases
exposure to workers. Therefore, the dose that would be received by
workers should be assessed before dismantling.
Both internal and external exposures are important in evalu-
ating worker doses. External exposures are caused by gamma-
emitting radionuclides (e.g., 60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu) in the radioac-
tive concrete, and internal exposures are caused by beta-emitting
radionuclides (e.g., 3H, 14C, and 55Fe) contained in dust generated
during dismantling. In this study, we focused on the external
exposure to workers, performing dosimetry according to computer
simulation. A model for evaluating the external dose to workers
during dismantling of the Kori-1 bio-shield was constructed, and a
scenario for dose assessment was designed. The three-dimensional
(3D) ALARA evaluation code VISIPLAN (SCKCEN; Mol, BEL) was
used for dose assessment. The dose rate around the bio-shield was
evaluated, and the exposure to aworker was evaluated according to
the scenario.open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
Fig. 1. Kori Unit 1 decommissioning and dismantling schedule.
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2.1. Simulation tools and methods
For the safety evaluation of workers dismantling the bio-shield,
the study was performed using the neutron transport code MCNP
and the dose evaluation code VISIPLAN as shown in Fig. 2. First, the
structure of the target Kori-1 bio-shield was analyzed, and aworker
scenario was designed. Based on this, the radioactive inventory was
evaluated using MCNP6. Based on the geometric structure (Fig. 3),
work scenario, and radionuclide data, the dose rate and external
dose to the worker was derived using VISIPLAN.Fig. 3. Geometry of bio-shield.2.2. Radioactive inventory calculations
The probabilistic code, MCNP, was used to evaluate the response
of the neutron flux to each part of the simulated bio-shield ge-
ometry. Because there is no actual data for the activation of the
Kori-1 bio-shield, the radioactivity must be evaluated through
simulations based on the surrounding geometry, i.e., the reactor
flux onto the bio-shield. MCNP6 is suitable for probabilistically
evaluating the reactions between the bio-shield and neutrons
generated by the reactor over a long period of time [6,7]. The
concrete composition was prepared using the standard concrete
nuclide composition ratio of ANSI/ANS 6.4, and the impurity was
calculated using the CASMO-3 code [8]. In previous studies, three
major long-lived nuclides (60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu) in the Kori-1 bio-Fig. 2. Scheme of research processshield were analyzed using MCNP6, and the resulting gamma
radionuclide distribution is shown in Fig. 4 [9,10]. The threefor worker dose assessment.
C. Lee et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 52 (2020) 2085e2091 2087nuclides are those that are expected to be contaminated at high
concentrations upon decommissioning, based on the analysis of
other bio-shields. In addition, considering the external dose coef-
ficient, the nuclide expected to lead to the highest exposure to the
worker was considered. The total radioactivity was less than 0.1 Bq/
g at the 397 cm region. The maximum radioactivity for 60Co, 152Eu,
and 154Eu were 4.53  103 Bq/g, 14.2 Bq/g, and 0.486 Bq/g,
respectively.
Because the results of the previous study were obtained just
after 40 years of operation, at the time of decommissioning, the
radioactive isotopes decayed during the period from permanent
shutdown to the actual decommissioning. In the decommission-
ing schedule of Kori Unit 1, the dismantling of the radioactive part
begins after the spent fuel is taken out. Therefore, we considered
two cooling periods, one of 8.5 years from the time of permanent
shutdown and one of 13.5 years during which the dismantling is
expected to be completed, as shown in Fig. 1. Based on the
radioactivity obtained using MCNP6, the external exposure
assessment for workers dismantling the bio-shield was
performed.Table 1




Inner diameter 317.5 cm
Outer diameter 527.5 cm2.3. Methodology of dose assessment
For the bio-shield worker dose assessment, the distribution of
the dose was analyzed using the 3D ALARA evaluation tool, VISI-
PLAN. VISIPLAN uses an internet interface to remotely calculate
doses and transmits the results of 3D data, allowing users to
calculate doses in 3D scenarios. The methods used in the dose
assessment take into consideration the position of the worker, the
duration of the work, and the geometric and source distribution
changes in the 3D computer simulation of the workplace, based on
the point-kernel calculations [11,12]. The input parameters for
analyzing the dose rate using VISIPLAN are shown in Table 1. The
radioactivity input to VISIPLAN was obtained by dividing the bio-
shield into 60 cells and averaging the radioactivity obtained from
the MCNP simulation over each cell.
Based on the dose rate data obtained using VISIPLAN, the dose to




where Dt is the entire external dose to a worker dismantling the
bio-shield (mSv), Dx is the external dose rate to a worker per-
forming specific subtask x (mSv/h), and Tx is the time spent on
subtask x (mSv). The dose received by the worker was determined
from the dose rate and exposure time spent during each process of
dismantling, for which the dose rate was determined according to
the position of the worker doing that task.
Depending on the task definition, the external dose for workers
will change considerably; therefore, the assumptions and decisions
made in the evaluation are important. First, a decision on how to
work is required. Among the several available methods for
dismantling the Bio-shield, diamond wire saw (DWS) cutting,
which is a suitable method for dismantling a large-scale structure,
was considered. DWS cutting can be operated as a wet cutting
method (using water for cooling and debris collection) or a dry
cutting method (using only a dust-collecting device). By comparing
the work times of the two methods, the difference in dose received
by the operator can be obtained. The two cutting methods are
compared in Table 2 [13,14].
As shown in Table 3, work scenarios for bio-shield dismantling
can be constructed considered based on DWS cutting [15]. For bio-
shield dismantling, two DWS operators and one assistant were
considered to perform the task in the following scenario. All work
was assumed to be performed continuously, i.e., preparatory work,
drilling, and concrete lifting were performed simultaneously for
different sections.ion in bio-shield (Bq/g).
Table 2
Characteristics of wet and dry DWS cutting.
Wet Cutting Dry Cutting
Setup time 4 Manhour
Cooling system Water Cold compressed air
Average Cutting rate(m2/h) 1.11 0.78
Wire life time(m2/m) ~1.5 ~1
Secondary waste Contaminated effluents
Induced by sludge collection and treatment system (filtration, drying)
Induced by dust collection system (filters, confinement boxes)
Table 3
Scenario of dismantling bio-shield.
Type of works Working hour (h) Working distance from center (m) Type of worker
Preparation 2 1.5 2 DWS operators
Drilling 1 2.5 1 assistant
Diamond wire saw Cutting e 1.0 2 DWS operators
Block lifting 1 2.5 1 assistant
Fig. 5. Dose rate on bio-shield (a) after permanent shutdown, (b) after 8.5 years, (c) after 13.5 years.
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To dismantle the concrete inside the bio-shield, it is assumed that
the cutting is performed in the internal space inside the bio-shield,
and from top to bottom. Each concrete section cut is assumed to be
approximately 1 m3. In this work, the cutting plan is divided into
inner and outer zones, and when the cutting is performed on a
portion with high radioactivity, the inner zone is cut first. On
average, three inner zone cuts and two outer zone cuts were per-
formed per block.
In summary, 20 concrete blocks were created for the inner zone,
and 27 concrete blocks for the outer zone at the same height.
Considering the average number of cuts required per block, 60 cuts
were performed in the inner zone and 54 in the outer zone. This is
the number of operations required to perform a 1-m high cut;
because the height of the bio-shield was approximately 15 m, 15
stacked concrete structures wit height of 1 m were dismantled.
Then, the doses at all heights were calculated, and the total time
and exposure levels experienced by the worker during bio-shield
cutting were calculated.
3. Results and discussions
The dose rate was assessed with VISIPLAN using the given ge-
ometry and the activation structure calculated byMCNP. Figs. 5 and6 show the dose rates before and after removing the inner zones of
the radioactive concrete during the dismantling process, and the
maximum dose rates are listed in Table 4.
The dose rate in the work area appears to have decreased
significantly after cooling compared with the rate before cooling.
Prior to cooling, themaximumdose rate is up to 6mSv/h at a height
of 2.5 m, as in the MCNP simulation. In most areas, the dose rate is
very high without protective measures and may exceed the work-
er's dose limit by ICRP [16e18]. After 8.5 years of cooling, the dose
rate was reduced to 1.4 mSv/h, and after 13.5, to 0.82 mSv/h.
However, even with lower doses after cooling, the dose rate may
exceed the worker dose limit; therefore, detailed dose assessments
are necessary for worker safety measures.
By comparing the dose rates before and after the cutting of the
inner zones, it can be seen that the dose rate in Fig. 6 is significantly
lower than that in Fig. 5, because most of the concrete radiation
occurred within 1 m. By comparing the dose rate before and after
cutting, it can be seen that the difference is more than 100 times. For
the cooling time of 8.5 years, no other protective measures are
required for the operator because the dose does not exceed 20 mSv,
assuminganannualworking timeof2,000hwhencutting theoutside
zone.
Fig. 7 shows the variation in dose with height and the distance
fromthewall.Moving toward thecenter, thedose fromthehot spot at
Fig. 6. Dose rate on bio-shield (a) after permanent shutdown, (b) after 8.5 years, (c) after 13.5 years (after removing the inner zones).
Table 4
Maximum dose rate comparison of evaluation results.
Cooldown Dose rate interior on Bio-shield interior (mSv/h)
No cut considered with inner zone cut
No cooldown 6.0 0.035
8.5 years cooldown 1.4 0.012
13.5 years cooldown 0.82 0.0056
Fig. 8. Dose rate of inner space of Bio-shield with 2 m height.
C. Lee et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 52 (2020) 2085e2091 20892m remains greater than that of the sidewall, and the dose decreases
exponentiallywith increasingheight.At 3m, thedose is thehighest at
thewall surface, but as theheight increases, thedose farthest fromthe
wall becomes the greatest. Fig. 8 shows the contributions of the three
gamma-emitting nuclides to the dose rate at the height of 3m. Of the
three radionuclides evaluated, 60Cohad thehighest effect, accounting
for 99.7% of the dose rate; in contrast, 152Eu and 154Eu showed rela-
tively lowdoses.This is similar to the ratioof activitiesprovidedby the
MCNP radioactivity evaluation.
Table 5 shows the results of evaluating theworker's working time
and dose based on the derived dose rate. The dismantling work timeFig. 7. Dose rate with height and distance from center.was determined based on the number of blocks. The time required to
cut one block was calculated as (preparation time þ cutting
time)  number of cuts per block. The cutting time was calculated
basedon the cuttingarea (geometrysegmentation) and cutting speed
(Table2). Theworking timeswere calculatedas5,159h forwet cutting
and 5,906 h for dry cutting. Therefore, the bio-shield dismantling
process was estimated to take 2.57 years with wet cutting and 2.95
years with dry cutting, assuming annual work rates of 2000 h/years.
Because the work speed of wet cutting is faster, the highTable 5
Working time and external dose during Bio-shield cutting.






DWS operator 650.86 748.14
Assistant 649.54 746.86
Table 6
Dose reduction due to protective measures.
No protection measure External exposure (mSv) Dose reduction (mSv) Reduction rate (%)
746.86 0.00 0.0
(1) Change Dismantling sequence 484.85 262.01 35.1
(2) Remote monitoring 426.73 320.13 42.9
(3) Shield installation (lead 1.2 cm) 522.80 224.06 50.0
(4) (1)þ(2) 284.49 462.37 61.9
(5) (1)þ(2)þ(3) 199.14 547.72 81.0
C. Lee et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 52 (2020) 2085e20912090activation parts are reached sooner compared with dry cutting,
thereby increasing the dose rate; however, the work is completed
ends sooner. Dry-cutting workers are estimated to receive 16%
more dose than wet-cutting workers. The maximum annual dose
for dry cutting worker, which occurs at the end of the project, was
calculated as 748 mSv per person without any protective measure.
The annual dose limit according to ICRP is 100 mSv for 5 years, or
equivalently an annual average of 20 mSv. Because the calculation
results exceed this average, there is a risk of exceeding the annual
dose limit if the worker performs other tasks that expose them to a
high dose. This indicates that adequate protectionmeasures against
radiation exposure are needed.
One way to reduce the work time is to change the dismantling
sequence. In the previous scenario, the method of cutting the
radioactive part and then the non-radioactive part was considered.
Instead, a method that involves crushing the non-radioactive part
first from the outside and then cutting the radioactive concrete can
be used based on the radiological evaluation. In this case, because
the time required for cutting the boundary between the radioactive
concrete and the non-radioactive concrete can be eliminated, the
working time can be shortened, and thus, a dose reduction can be
expected.
Next, in the previous scenario, the cutting situation was
analyzed next to the equipment; however, in the cutting process,
the monitoring is performed by the operator without any addi-
tional work. Therefore, instead of being next to the equipment
during this period, if the worker moves outside, where the dose
rate is low and monitors the operation remotely, workers will not
be exposed to the radiation during this time.
For the protection, for 0.5 mmPb, which is generally used, the
protection is greater than 95% for low radioactivity; however, the
main sources are 1.33 MeV and 1.17 MeV 60Co in this case. For lead,
the half-layer is very thick (1.2 cm) for 60Co, and the efficiency of
60Co protection in a 0.5-mmPb shield is approximately 3%, and
5 mm is 70% effective. Therefore, it would be better to consider
installing shields rather than making protective clothing. If a 5-mm
copper shield is installed, a 30% reduction is expected.
As a result of the evaluation of the considered protective mea-
sures, the dose reduction rates according to the protective mea-
sures can be compared, as listed in Table 6.
The baseline doses were based on the operator during the dry
cutting, which had the highest dose when evaluating the exposure.
The evaluation shows that the reduction rate according to the
considered dose reduction method was approximately 35% for the
change in the cutting sequence, 43% for the remotemonitoring, and
70% for the shield installation. When all protection measures are
considered, the dose was 1990 mSv, which was reduced by
approximately 73.3%. However, in this case, the dose received by
worker still exceeds the annual dose limit 50 mSv, but the present
scenario is that three workers perform all the work. Whenmultiple
teams work alternately, individual worker doses can be lowered
below theworker dose limit. To do this, it is possible to calculate the
need for 4 teams and 12 workers, considering all the methods, andby this measure, the worker's dose can be maintained be below the
annual dose limit.
4. Conclusions
In this study, the bio-shield dose rate was simulated using
VISIPLAN to assess the worker dose for the safety evaluation of the
Kori-1 bio-shield dismantling process. The maximum annual
external dose was calculated as 746.86 mSv for a DWS operator
performing dry cutting to dismantle the bio-shield. Therefore,
appropriate protective measures, such as changing dismantling
sequence, remote monitoring, shield installation, and adjustment
of work team are necessary for bio-shield dismantling with dry
cutting. Through these protective measures, it was found that the
worker's dose could be below the dose limit. For the entire external
dose received by a worker during bio-shield dismantling, the wet
cuttingmethod results in less dose, but secondarywaste generation
(126.7 L/m2) must be considered [14].
By using the developed dose evaluation system, it was possible
to secure the safety of the worker by confirming the dose to the
worker before dismantling. It was also possible to perform radio-
logical comparisons by deriving the doses for different equipment
that can be considered in dismantling situations. These compari-
sons can be used to optimize the dismantling equipment and
calculate the radiological costs accordingly. Because the simulated
situation differs from actual plant operation, the evaluated dose
and the actual dose may differ. Measured dose rates, which can be
incorporated into VISIPLAN, can be used to obtain the actual dose
distribution by correcting the external dose to match the actual
measured value at a certain position. Depending on the used dose
evaluation system, it is possible to use different inputs from other
power plants as well as other targets for preliminary dose
assessment.
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